Use offense to inform defense. Find flaws before the bad guys do.

Interested in learning more?
Check out the list of upcoming events offering "Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling (SEC504)" at https://pen-testing.sans.org/events/
KaZaA Media Desktop Virus:  
W32/kwbot

By:  Rita J Will  
October 2, 2002  
GCIH Practical Assignment V2.1 (revised April 8 2002)  
Option 2 – Support for the Cyber Defense Initiative
Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3
Targeted Port .................................................................................................................. 3
  Targeted service ......................................................................................................... 4
  Description .................................................................................................................. 4
Protocol .......................................................................................................................... 6
  • TCP ......................................................................................................................... 7
  • UDP ......................................................................................................................... 8
Vulnerabilities ............................................................................................................... 9
Specific Exploit ............................................................................................................ 12
Exploit Details ............................................................................................................. 12
  Name: ......................................................................................................................... 12
  Aliases: ...................................................................................................................... 12
  Variants: ...................................................................................................................... 12
  Operating System: .................................................................................................. 12
  Protocols/Services: ................................................................................................ 12
  Brief Description: .................................................................................................. 12
  Worm or Virus?: ..................................................................................................... 12
Description of Variants: ............................................................................................. 13
Protocol Description ................................................................................................... 13
How the exploit works ................................................................................................. 26
Diagram ......................................................................................................................... 31
How to use the exploit .................................................................................................. 34
Signature of the attack ................................................................................................. 35
How to protect against it .............................................................................................. 38
Source code/Pseudo code ............................................................................................ 44
Additional Information ............................................................................................... 44
Appendixes .................................................................................................................. 45
  A ................................................................................................................................. 45
  B ................................................................................................................................. 49
References .................................................................................................................... 52
**Introduction**

"Let’s Download Some Mariachi Music for the Cinco De Mayo Party!"

I never paid that much attention to music downloads until one day I wanted to download some mariachi music for a Cinco De Mayo Party and a friend of mine, that has a teenager, showed me how to do it. I couldn’t get the idea out of my head that people were downloading and sharing files with everyone on the Internet directly from their hard drives. Not knowing who is accessing their shared folders or what they were getting when they downloaded a file. Are you only sharing what you intended? Is it really a media file you just downloaded? File sharing networks would be a good vehicle to compromise a number of home systems to use for a Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack or to just penetrate a network. To me this seems to be a vulnerability “petree dish” and more exploits were on their way.

KaZaA UDP/TCP 1214 was on the top ten list and I decided to look for an exploit there. I found the KaZaA worm “Benjamin”, then “K0wbot.1.3.B” came along, and I decided to use that as my topic. The KaZaA virus scratched the surface of what can be done in this open file-sharing environment if carefully planned and executed. This paper discusses how the KaZaA file sharing system works and how it could be used as a means to compromise numerous hosts and an example of an exploit that could have been used for this purpose.

**Targeted Port**

![Diagram of Targeted Port](image)

There are 65535 ports used by Internet Protocols for communication. They are defined in three groups.

Ports 1-1023 are the “well-known ports” assigned by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to ensure all use the same ports for common services.  

---

1. **Mastering Network Security** by Chris Brenton
ports are de facto standards used to insure that everyone can access services on other machines without needing to guess which port number is used by the service”.

Ports 1024-49151 are known as the “registered ports”. They can be assigned by IANA for specific applications and services.

Ports 49152 through 65535 are “Dynamic” and/or “Private Ports”. They are primarily used for return communication also called ephemeral ports. The ephemeral ports are typically chosen by the client’s operating system when initiating a connection to a server/application.

Port 1214 is assigned by IANA to KaZaA for the Media Desktop communications.

**Targeted service**

KaZaA is a client application referred to as “Media Desktop” used to connect to the FastTrack file-sharing network. Users are connected to thousands of other KaZaA users in a large Centralized/Decentralized file-sharing network where users can share files such as movies, music, documents, software, viruses, etc. Anything you choose to share with the outside world, and possibly some things that you didn’t intend to share. Similar applications are Morpheus and LimeWire. Each client application is used to connect to a file-sharing network call Peer-to-Peer (P2P). Like KaZaA, the Morpheus client also connects to the FastTrack P2P. LimeWire is used to connect to a different type of P2P called Gnutella.

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) assigned UDP/TCP port 1214 for KaZaA P2P. This doesn’t mean that an application developer cannot use that port for their application; it just means that IANA has officially assigned it for KaZaA.

**Description**

There are two basic types of file sharing networks, client/server and P2P. In the client/server model, clients access the same server to share files. In the P2P model, all computers can act as client or server and can all access each other.
Early on the Internet performed as a Peer-to-Peer network. All computers could access each other directly and each could play the role of client or server. Then the Internet moved more into the client/server model. This happened when Firewalls, Network Address Translation (NAT) came on the scene. Recently, P2P networks have become popular again.

There are several file sharing networks available today using different topologies. Three of those topologies are Centralized, Decentralized or a combination of the two. Below is a brief description of each.

- Centralized topology would be similar to the Client/Server model shown above. There are a few media sharing networks that use this topology, one example is SETI@Home. In a centralized topology, users connect to a centralized server where they can be registered and/or files can be subject to content filtering. The server would have all of the shared files, which would make that a single point of failure. If something happened to that server, the file-sharing system would be worthless.

- In the truly decentralized topology such as the Gnutella network, which is used by LimeWire, there is no centralized server, therefore, no registration, logging, or content filtering. However, this type of network is more scalable and fault-tolerant. If a Node shuts down, it will not impact the rest of the network. The same file could be offered in many places throughout the network.

- The combination of centralized/decentralized is used by KaZaA and Morpheus. They are both based on FastTrack technology. A centralized server is still responsible for user registration and some logging. In this topology, the user first registers with a centralized server but downloading files, is requested from other peers like in a decentralized architecture.

KaZaA is a company in Amsterdam that developed the FastTrack P2P technology in March 2001. KaZaA “Media Desktop” and Morpheus are actually clients used to access
the FastTrack P2P. The developers took the Gnutella decentralized file-sharing concept and improved on it by adding “Supernodes” to perform as indexing servers. Along with Supernodes, there is also another participant in the FastTrack P2P, Peers. A Peer is everyone participating in the FastTrack network. A Supernode is a Peer that is designated as a Supernode because of bandwidth or processing power. Any Peer on the network could be used as a Supernode.

The FastTrack network grew quickly because of the already existing MusicCity users. MusicCity originally used the OpenNap file-sharing network but OpenNap was shutdown by the RIAA in 2001. MusicCity was then reintroduced to it’s users as Morpheus using the FastTrack network. Morpheus was a modified version of the KaZaA client

In November 2001, KaZaA was sued by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry for distributing copyrighted materials. To avoid the charges and possible shutdown, KaZaA was sold to Sharman Networks in Australia in January 2002. A couple of months later, it was determined that the users themselves were responsible for the illegal distribution of copyrighted material since they are shared and downloaded peer to peer. Therefore, the November ruling was overturned.

The most recent version of KaZaA can be downloaded at http://www.KaZaA.com. The user downloads it, installs it and they are on the KaZaA network sharing files whether they like it or not. Using the default settings shares a folder called “My Shared Folder” in the “Program files\Kazaa” directory. In the earlier version, KaZaA would search your hard drive for all media files to automatically share. It would share them regardless of where they were in the directory structure.

KaZaA and Morpheus are the most popular file-sharing clients available right now for a couple of reasons. 1) They allow the users to share more than just media files, you can share any file with any file extension. Many file sharing systems like Napster and AudioGalaxy, share only mp3 files. 2) They provide “SmartStream” and “FastStream” technologies. SmartStream addresses incomplete file downloads. For example, during a file download there is a network connection issue or the peer serving the file disconnects, SmartStream will connect to another user offering the same file or reinitiate the download when it is able. FastStream deals with download speed. If there is more than one peer that is offering the file for download, it will use the list of peers to download the file instead of just one. This increases the speed of the download. Other file-sharing systems like Napster and Gnutella were unable to perform these functions which caused users to be disappointed because of frequent incomplete file transfers and slow downloads.

**Protocol**

There are two Internet protocols used by the KaZaA Desktop for communication and file sharing. They are Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
• **TCP**

TCP is considered a connection-oriented communication, which can provide a reliable means to deliver packets. The reason it is referred to as connection-oriented, it establishes a connection between two hosts and that connection remains until it is torn down when the communication is complete.

To establish a connection, first a "three-way handshake" is performed. This is the Client sending a "syn" packet to the Server saying "I am requesting a connection with you". If the Server receives the "syn" packet, he will respond with a "synack" packet saying "I got your request to initiate a connection with me." The Client will respond to the "synack" with an "ack" to let the Server know that he received the "synack". The connection is then established.

The Client and the Server keep track of their individual communications with numerous hosts by using source IP and source port with destination IP and destination port.

Another piece of important information contained in the TCP communication is the sequence numbers. When the Client sends his initial "syn" packet, it includes a sequence number. The "synack" returned from the Server, acknowledges the sequence number provided by the Client incrementing it by one, and provides a sequence number of his own. The "handshake" is completed and they can start passing data back and forth.

Here is an example of a complete TCP connection. User A wants to download file from Server B. User A would send a "syn" packet requesting a connection to be established. Server B would respond with a "synack" to acknowledge the "syn". User A would return an "ack" packet to acknowledge the "synack" and complete the handshake.

Next Server B would send a “push” packet probably asking for a Username. User A would provide his Username in a “push” packet back to Server B. Each “push” packet is acknowledged by the recipient. Most times the “ack” will be sent with the next “push” packet but there are cases where just an “ack” packet will be sent to acknowledge receipt of the data. User A might send a data packet or "push" packet with an "ls" command. The "ls" command would show User A a list of files that are available for download. Server B would respond with an "ack" acknowledging receipt of the bytes in the "push" packet and then send a "push" packet with the list of files as requested. It is possible that the data in the "push" packet be transferred in more than one packet. For example, the list of filenames might be transferred in two packets. TCP will keep track of the packets of data by keeping track of the bytes transferred and sequence numbers in order to put them back together in the proper order. User A asks to download a particular file and Server B will send a series of packets each containing a chunk of the data until the entire file has been transferred. User A acknowledges the bytes as they are received. After all of the bytes have been received, User A can close the
connection if he does not want to download another file. To do that, he sends a "fin" packet to Server B. Server B responds with an "ack", acknowledging the "fin" and sending another "fin" packet to User A agreeing that he is also ready to close the connection. User A acknowledges Server B "fin" packet and the connection is closed gracefully.

In addition to keeping track of the bytes and acknowledging them, TCP also offers another service, a time-out mechanism to detect if data has been lost. If the next byte of data has not been received in a certain time or data has not been acknowledged, TCP will ask that packet to be retransmitted. This makes TCP the most reliable Internet Protocol to transfer data.

- **UDP**
  UDP is a connectionless communication. No handshake is required for this protocol to communicate. UDP uses ports to distinguish between several connections as opposed to sequence numbers. It provides no reliability or packet recovery as TCP does. UDP packets are smaller and use less resources than TCP. It is used where reliability is not required.

For downloads and searches, data is being transferred between Supernodes and peers, therefore TCP is used for reliability.

UDP port 1214 is used for “peer to Supernode” and “Supernode to Supernode” communication. Since KaZaA has many Supernodes that a peer can communicate with, it is not necessary to establish connection with all of them. So in order to do a quick search to see if a Supernode is available, it uses UDP. If a packet gets lost, it’s not important.

When the “KaZaA Media Desktop” has been started at either window start up or when the user double clicks on the proper desktop icon, the communication begins with a KaZaA server on port 80. The KaZaA server receives identification information from the user (peer) and then provides information to the peer about nearby Supernodes (peers designated as Supernodes). The peer then uses UDP 1214 to check for those Supernodes. It follows up with TCP 1214 for any Supernode from whom the peer receives a UDP 1214 return packet. If the TCP 1214 handshake sequence is completed, the peer knows that Supernode is available for a search task.

When the peer wants to search for a file, the request will go to the Supernode using TCP 1214 and ask to find a string, the Supernode will contact other Supernodes and peers to find a list of files that contain the string and provide a list to the requesting peer. The peer can choose from that list to download the desired file(s).

Downloading is done on TCP 1214 and it is performed peer-to-peer. The Supernode is out of the communication at this point and just stands by for the next search task.
Vulnerabilities

Having KaZaA up and running on your desktop makes you somewhat vulnerable. KaZaA users typically are not aware what files folders they are sharing or how to stop sharing. A laboratory study on the usability of KaZaA discovered \(^2\) “…the majority of the users in our study were unable to tell what files they were sharing, and sometimes incorrectly assumed they were not sharing any files when in fact they were sharing all files on their hard drive.” This is true with many applications and software, not enough information or knowledge of the application can result in vulnerabilities due to configuration errors. It would be easy to inadvertently share files or file folders that may have personal information, finances, e-mail, cookies with passwords, credit card information, etc. When you choose to allow users to access files directly from your computer, you are putting yourself at a considerable risk. Below are screen-prints of a search using the word “outlook” another one when searching for “qdata” (Quicken default filename).

---

\(^2\) Usability and privacy: a study of Kazaa P2P file-sharing, by Nathaniel S. Good and Aaron Krekelberg
The search found some users that are sharing their financial information from Quicken and some that are sharing their e-mail with the outside world as well. The quicken files could include bank account numbers.

Using the default configuration of the most recent version of KaZaA, c:\Program Files\KaZaA\My Shared Folder is shared by default. There are three ways in KaZaA to choose to share other folders, which to some is a little confusing on what is selected. If you click the check box for the “My Documents” folder, it may not be clear to many users that all folders and files under that are now going to be shared. There is only one place to remove folders from being shared and it is a menu item called “Finding Media to Share”. It’s not clear that you can see what you are sharing or that you might be able to change the settings.

Downloading software or media files from the Internet is a risk no matter how it’s accomplished, but I would consider downloading files directly from unknown users to be a much greater risk. As mentioned in the introduction, users are downloading files from someone they don’t know and aren’t exactly sure what they are getting. KaZaA has a warning on their website stating “All files that are accessible using KaZaA Media Desktop (KMD) originate from other users of KaZaA. This means that there will always be the risk of irresponsible users introducing viruses.” They say they are trying to do something about that, but they really can’t help in this environment without placing themselves in the middle and scan everything that goes back and forth. Currently KaZaA has a centralized server that users connect to each time they bring up KaZaA media desktop. They have to register to that server, which means there is some sort of logging and accountability when users first come on to the network. However, the user information can be bogus and may not provide an accurate security audit trail. Once the registration is complete, the KaZaA server is out of the communication. Unless the user asks to refresh the page or clicks start to reconnect. Since the Supernodes are just Peers, there is no logging or content filtering being done at that point.

KaZaA comes bundled with some anti-virus evaluation software in an effort to protect their users. You can choose to download and use the software as a trial or for a price.

Some Peer-to-Peer filing sharing systems only allow sharing of mp3 files (i.e. AudioGalaxy). This would require a hacker to successfully insert malicious code into an mp3 file and figure a way to execute it. There has only been one report that I could find of a buffer overflow using an mp3 file and Winamp player. KaZaA on the other hand, allows users to share any type of file with any file extension. This would allow a hacker to easily inject a virus into the KaZaA Peer-to-Peer network.

Another reason KaZaA users are vulnerable and a potential target for compromise is the fact that they are usually home users with no virus detection, firewalls, or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Typically, home users are not aware of the risk involved with

---

a fast Ethernet connection to their computer. No knowledge of what is open from the
Internet by default or how active the hacker community really is.

Anti-virus software is usually supplied with the home computer software suite, but the
user must authorize the update to take place in most cases. The anti-virus software can
be useless, if the signature list is not updated regularly. If the anti-virus software is not
included, the user must buy a copy for their personal use. There are a few free ones out
there, but are not as effective as the top ones such as McAfee and Norton.

A firewall on a home computer or at the perimeter could prevent inbound connections
from the Internet. Most home users are not hosting a website, so there would be no need
for any connections to be initiated from the Internet to their computer. So in the case of a
virus that opens a backdoor for a hacker, the firewall would not allow the inbound
connection to be initiated and therefore the backdoor would be useless. Another point to
make about the Network Firewall at the perimeter preventing inbound connections, no
other KaZaA user would be able to access your share folder. When a user requests to
download a file from you, they attempt to initiate a connection and a network perimeter
firewall would stop that attempt.

Computer based firewalls on the other hand, like BlackIce or Zone Alarm, restrict access
by application. This would still allow other KaZaA users to access your shared folder.
This is still not going to prevent the user from downloading a virus or sharing some
personal files inadvertently.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in front of the home network would benefit if the user
did download a virus and opened a backdoor if the IDS rules were properly configured to
pick up particular attack signatures. If the anti-virus software did not detect the virus,
possibly the IDS system would alert the user that it detected some unusual activity.

There are free firewalls and IDS systems available, but the point is that the average home
user would not be concerned with the possibility that someone would want to access their
computer and use it for malicious activity. Many would not take the extra steps to secure
their home computer. There is also the problem of improperly configuring these security
devices and creating a false sense of security, allowing viruses to go undetected for long
periods in the home user environment. This opens them up for a patient hacker that
wants to start the distribution of a virus and let it propagate at it’s own rate. When
enough computers are under his control, use them for a possible distributed attack.

So far, we have only talked about using the virus to infect many computers to for a
DDOS, but the virus could also be used to penetrate a network. All that is needed is an
internal user to download the virus and infect his workstation. If users were allowed to
use IRC chat from inside their network, the hacker would be free to access that system
through his channel that he created with the virus. If the system successfully sent a
message with information about the infected system, the hacker would know it was there
and available. If the hacker has access to a workstation on the inside, it wouldn’t be
difficult to map out most of the network by looking at the workstation configuration,
routes, host files, DNS, etc. An example is the hack into Monkey.org in March of 2002 (article can be found at http://lwn.net/Articles/1486/). An administrator downloaded IRSSI chat client at the request of the users, and installed a code that was already contaminated. It contained a “backdoor” that was used to gain root access to a server at Monkey.org to contaminate some popular freeware with some malicious code. The malicious code in the freeware also opened a backdoor. One user on the internal network, permitted to download, install, or use open chat channels, can compromise the entire network.

One last point about KaZaA users vulnerability is their unlawful distribution of copyrighted materials. As mentioned above, the Dutch courts have determined that it is the users responsibility to properly handle copyrighted materials. The P2P client companies may no longer be held responsible and the users themselves will have to pay the price if the law decides enforce.

Specific Exploit

Exploit Details

Name:
W32.K0wbot.1.2/1.3.a/1.3.b

Aliases:
BackDoor-AGT
WORM_KWBOT.A
W32.Kwbot.Worm
W32/Kwbot-A

Variants:
Worm.Kazaa.Benja or W32/Benjamin

Operating System:
Windows 95/98/NT/ME/2000/XP

Protocols/Services:
TCP/UDP Port 1214 and reports of port 6667 for the IRC backdoor.

Brief Description:
The victim downloads the virus from another KaZaA user and it replicates itself 150 times disguised as popular media files. Some report that it contains an IRC client that waits for commands from the attacker.

Worm or Virus?:
There are many conflicting descriptions of worms vs. viruses. From the Sans Incident Handling Course Material, it appears that this exploit doesn’t really fit into either
category neatly. It fits more closely to the virus description. Malicious code is called a worm when it requires no specific action on the part of the user to enable infection and propagation. It just spreads. If the code requires the user to open an e-mail or load a screen saver or take some action, then it is called a virus.” This malware requires the user to download the file from an infected machine and then execute it in order for it to infect the machine. It does not propagate on its own. Therefore, for the remainder of this paper, Kwbot will be referred to as a virus or malware.

**Description of Variants:**
The first virus to infect the KaZaA community was known as the Benjamin virus. Both put a copy of itself in the Windows/System directory and modified the registry to load at startup. Like Kwbot, Benjamin replicated itself in the share folder with many different names to attract more victims. However, Benjamin replicated itself 1000+ times in the share folder and Kwbot only created approximately 150 all the same file size (21KB). Benjamin padded the files with garbage bytes so the file sizes were inconsistent. The virus itself was 216KB. Since it created so many copies of different size files, it filled up the users hard drive or crashed the computer while processing. Some users reports 100 percent of their processing cycles were being consumed by the virus.

Benjamin was reported to have opened a \Window\temp\system32 directory as a share in KaZaA. It was determined by F-Security, that the virus was written to make money because it opened a web page in Germany that contained advertisements.

**Protocol Description**
NOTE: For packets captures and screen prints in the following sections, IP addresses have been changed to private address space and the Usernames changed to hide the identity of the real users.

KaZaA uses the FastTrack P2P technology, which is considered a centralized and decentralized file sharing system. The reason it is considered a combination of those types is the peer has a centralized relationship with a Supernode. The Supernodes then work together as a decentralized network and the peers download directly from each other as in a decentralized file-sharing network. The Supernodes propagate queries among themselves in order to fulfill their peer’s requests. For example, a KaZaA user decides to search for a file with the word “working”, the request goes to a known Supernode and the Supernode initiates a search. If the Supernode does not have a sufficient index of files with that string it will ask another Supernode and that Supernode will possibly pass that request on to another. To avoid long searches using resources, the search will be limited by a TTL (time to live), meaning it will only propagate so many hops before it quits looking. The Supernodes can be any KaZaA user on the network, they are usually chosen for their bandwidth and processing power.

Below is an illustration of the Centralized/Decentralized file-sharing network.

---

Once KaZaA is downloaded and installed, it creates an icon on the desktop called “Media Desktop”. Double click is required to open the media desktop. However, KaZaA is running after boot up in the background. If the media desktop window is closed it will still be minimized in the system tray.

When starting the “media desktop” with all of it’s advertisements, it doesn’t launch the default web browser. It does make use of http (port 80) for making sure it has a connection to the Internet and can contact KaZaA. The normal TCP handshake is completed and the user is connected.

After the user was connected, nmap was used to determine what ports were open on the test box with the KaZaA Media Desktop client is active. Nmap is a free tool used here to perform port scans and vulnerability testing. The scanning box was running Linux OS and was located on the same network as the target system and complete scan of 65535 UDP and TCP ports was initiated. Below is the result of an nmap scan. Nmap shows the IP address of the box that was scanned, 192.168.1.102. The next line shows that 131065 ports scanned are closed. That means that we scanned 65,535 UDP and TCP ports totaling 131,070 and 5 ports are listed in a state of open which leaves 131,065 ports as closed.

Ports UDP/TCP 1214 are open and shown as unknown. These are the ports that are opened by KaZaA for the normal activity of the KaZaA user. This means that the computer is listening on these ports for any incoming communication using those ports. For example, if another KaZaA user wants to download a file from this box, they would send a “syn” packet to this computer on TCP port 1214 and this computer would accept that request and respond accordingly. Then there are the typical netbios ports for windows, ports 137, 138 and 139. All windows operating systems open these netbios ports by default. These ports are used for mapping network drives; windows name resolution; and other windows services.

The next thing nmap will indicate is how long it took to complete the scan. In this case it took 86 seconds. Scans such as this would take longer across the Internet, this was done on a small internal network.

---

5 http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2001/12/14/topologies_one.html
Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA22 (www.insecure.org/nmap/)
Interesting ports on (192.168.1.102):
(The 131065 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>137/udp</td>
<td>open</td>
<td>netbios-ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138/udp</td>
<td>open</td>
<td>netbios-dgm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139/tcp</td>
<td>open</td>
<td>netbios-ssn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1214/tcp</td>
<td>open</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1214/udp</td>
<td>open</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 86 seconds

Port 80 does not show in the nmap scan above. That is because it only uses it to make an outbound connection to the KaZaA server. The ports that are listed are open, which means that are waiting to accept inbound traffic on those ports and are tied to services or applications running on the box. The port 80 communications from the peer to the KaZaA server, is an outbound connection only.

KaZaA uses port 80 for the user registration as shown below. The first two packets show the “syn”, “synack” and the “ack” to complete the TCP handshake highlighted below. The fourth packet shows the KaZaA user, 192.168.1.102 sending a request for the media desktop page shown in bold below.

```
20223617:20223617(0) win 8192 <mss 1460,nop,nop,ackOK> (DF) (ttl 128, id 58391, len 48)
0x0000 4500 0030 e417 4000 8006 991f c0a8 0168 E..0..@.........h
0x0010 xxxx xxxx 076f 0050 0134 9681 0000 0000...o.P.4.......
0x0020 7002 2000 461a 0000 0204 05b4 0101 0402 p...F........

1816788769:1816788769(0) ack 20223618 win 65535 <mss 1460> (ttl 48, id 12336, len 44)
0x0000 4500 002c 3030 0000 3006 dd0b xxxx xxxx E..,00..0....t..
0x0010 c0a8 0168 0050 076f 6c49 ff21 0134 9682 .h.P.OI.:4...
0x0020 6012 ffff 0fa5 0000 0204 05b4 40d7 ............p..F

ack 1 win 8760 (DF) (ttl 128, id 60183, len 40)
0x0000 4500 0028 eb17 4000 8006 9227 c0a8 0168 E...(0)....'..h
0x0010 xxxx xxxx 076f 0050 0134 9682 6c49 ff22 .t...o.P..ll.""'
0x0020 5010 2238 052a 0000 P."*

1:320(319) ack 1 win 8760 (DF) (ttl 128, id 60439, len 359)
0x0000 4500 0167 ec17 4000 8006 8f99 c0a8 0168 E..g...@.........h
0x0010 xxxx xxxx 076f 0050 0134 9682 6c49 ff22 .t...o.P..ll.""
0x0020 5018 2238 5d17 0000 4745 5420 2f65 6e2f P."GQ..GET./en/
0x0030 6b6d 7463 7461 7274 2e68 746d 3f63 6c69 kmdstart.htm?cli
0x0040 656e 743d 6b6d 2676 652d 7365 7373 7374 ent=kmd&ver=172.
0x0050 4854 5450 2f31 2e31 0d0a 4163 6365 7074 HTTP/1.1..Accept
0x0060 3a20 2a2f 2a0d 0a41 6363 6570 742d 4c61 :/*.Accept-La
0x0070 66e7 7561 6765 3a20 656e 2d75 730d 0a41 nguage=en-us..A
0x0080 6363 6570 742d 456e 6469 6667 3a20 ccept-Encoding:
0x0090 677a 6970 2c20 6465 666c 6665 6164 6f6d gzip,.deflate..I
```
The KaZaA servers then sends the complete Media Desktop page, as we will see below.

Ethereal was used to piece the entire conversation together and make packets dumps easier to read to see where the peer registers with the KaZaA server using his username. Ethereal is a free tool that will string together the TCP conversation and it’s data, allows for easy filtering, and real time packet captures on Windows or Unix platforms.

The first section is the data that the peer sent to the KaZaA server. On the first line, we see the request for the Media Desktop (kmdstart) and then there is information about the peer, for example, that it is a Windows 98 OS. The KaZaA server tells the peer what type of system it is and what version of Apache it’s using. All the same information included in the packets dumps, Ethereal just puts in a little easier to read format. Still no clear indication of where the registration takes place.
The next screen print shows where each time the Media Desktop is started, there is another communication with another server at KaZaA called the update server. Here we see information about the user is passed to server to check for any changes since the last time. The first line shows the e-mail address that is configured when the KaZaA client is first installed, whether the user chooses to get the newsletter or not, and the version of the KaZaA client. Still doesn’t look like the user registration is being done here.

Further analysis of the packet captures and using Ethereal has proved that the Username registration is being done with a cookie. The Username information is located in the c:\Windows\user.dat file. Here is a screen print of the Ethereal TCP stream that led to that conclusion.
In the last line of the screen dump, it says “getCookie(‘usrAgentInfo’)”. The “usrAgentInfo” string is located in the c:\Windows\user.dat file and contains the Username and share folders. The above was a TCP stream captured between the KaZaA server and the peer after the initial KaZaA Media Desktop page had been sent.

Once the user registration is completed, a series of UDP 1214 packets are transmitted from the KaZaA Media Desktop to various addresses on the Internet. In the example below, the names have been changed to “Supernode1”, Supernode2”, etc, in order to hide the identity of the real users. Remember Supernodes are just Peers with large bandwidth and fast processors, so these Supernodes are in most cases home users like our test box. These are the Supernodes provided by KaZaA. The peer, 192.168.1.102, is letting the Supernodes know that he is online and the peer is finding out which Supernodes are online and available.

Below is an example of the UDP 1214 communication. A UDP 1214 packet goes out to each one of the Supernodes on the Peers list. In the first packet the Peer, 192.168.1.102 sends a UDP 1214 packet to Supernode1.optonline.net. Note that the UDP packets do not have a “syn” label or “ack” label as the TCP packets do. As discussed in the Protocol section, the UDP is a connectionless protocol, so it doesn’t perform the handshake.

```
08:37:19.147179 192.168.1.102.1214 > Supernode1.optonline.net.1214:
[udp sum ok] udp 12 (ttl 128, id 20524, len 40)
```
If the peer receives a UDP port 1214 packet back from one of the Supernodes, it sends a TCP 1214 Sync packet to the Supernode to establish a connection. If the Supernode responds with a “synack”, the Peer sends an “ack” to complete the TCP handshake and the connection is established. Once he establishes a connection with a Supernode he does not continue to find one to connect. On the other hand, if the Supernode sends a reset, the peer knows he isn’t available and he moves on to the next Supernode on the list.

After the peer has established a communication with a Supernode, there communication stays alive until one of the two hosts cancels the connection by logging off KaZaA, shutting down their computer, network problems, etc. The communication is kept alive with a periodic communication with the Supernode initiated by the Peer so another handshake is not necessary for them to communicate. The first packet shows the Peer, 192.168.1.102 sending a packet to Supernode.nc.rr.com. The second packet is a “push” packet and an acknowledgement of the first packet sent by the Peer. The third packet shows the Peer acknowledging the “push” packet from the Supernode and the keep-alive is completed. In the event that the Supernode would not respond, the KaZaA Peer would establish a connection with another Supernode on his list provided by KaZaA in the start up communication.
Next, we will look at an example of a search. On the KaZaA Media Desktop, the user can search for a string and the Supernode will return a list of files containing that string. KaZaA will match that string to the filename, extension, information in the description, file size, user, etc. The search option is a very versatile. Whatever it can find with that string in someone’s share folders, the user can download.

Here is the dump of the search request. Since the Peer already has an active connection with the Supernode, only a “push” packet is sent with the string the users wishes to search.

The first packet in the example below is the “push” packet containing the string sent from the Peer, 192.168.1.102 to the Supernode.nc.rr.com on TCP port 1214. The second packet is the Supernode acknowledging the request and sending any information he might have in his index in a “push” packet. The information would consist of filenames, usernames, file sizes, etc. All of the information he has about files that match that search request. The third packet shows the Peer, 192.168.1.102 acknowledging the receipt of the first chunk of data sent by the Supernode.

The communication continues with the Peer sending “ack” for each “push” packet the Supernode sends until the list of files the Supernode found are provided to the Peer. The last packet in the example is the Peer acknowledging the last chunk of data from the Supernode.
Suppose the user searched for the word “working”. The Supernode checks his index and returns a list of KaZaA users that are sharing files with the word “working”, or it will send the request on to another Supernode to see if he has any entries that match the search request. Below is a screen print of the results of this search. In the screen print below, not all of the filenames have the word working. The word “working” must be in the name of the artist, or in the description. For example, look towards the top at Stuart Little Two (1 of 2), over in the next column, under artist; it says, “NOT WORKING”. This explains why that particular file came up in the search request.
The user can double click on an entry that he wishes to download and the KaZaA media desktop attempts to contact that user to get the file download started. If he cannot make contact with that user, it will try another user that returned the same entry for the search. If KaZaA can make contact with more than one user offering the same file name, it will perform a multi-segmented download. That means it uses the two or more users that offer the same file and downloads the file from all of them simultaneously to ensure the quickest download time. In the example, the use of the + and – signs shows that there is more than one entry for the same file. Multi-segmented download is another reason the FastTrack network is popular, the quicker the download the better.

As soon as the user double clicks on the entry he wants to download, the download begins. The progress can be viewed on the “traffic” window.

The traffic viewer shows the bytes being transferred and whom (username) the file is coming from. In this example, the username is “biggerdaddy”.
The window labeled “Upload” at the bottom of the screen would show any downloads being performed from this user’s share folder. However, if you do not happen to look at the “traffic” window while online and close KaZaA, the entries will be cleared when KaZaA is reopened. In other words, the “Upload” log clears each time KaZaA is closed, and there would be no way of seeing who downloaded a file from your machine after the fact.

Below is an example of the download negotiation. These first three packets show the typical TCP handshake. The KaZaA user, 192.168.1.102 sends a “Sync” packet when he decides what file to download and double-click on the file name.

08:41:15.205668 192.168.1.102.3066 > peer1.rochester.rr.com.1214: S [tcp sum ok] 211385232:211385232(0) win 8192 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 128, id 31535, len 48)
0x0000   4500 0030 7b2f 4000 8006 c492 c0a8 0166        E..0{/@........f
0x0010   xxxx xxxx 0bfa 04be 0c99 7b90 0000 0000        BB........{.....
0x0020   7002 2000 0f38 0000 0204 05b4 0101 0402        p....8........

08:41:17.370064 peer1.rochester.rr.com.1214 > 192.168.1.102.3066: S [tcp sum ok] 2698916057:2698916057(0) ack 211385233 win 17520 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 112, id 58858, len 48)
0x0000   4500 0030 e5ea 4000 7006 69d7 xxxx xxxx        E..0.@.p.i.BB..
0x0010   c0a8 0166 04be 0bfa a0de 30d9 0c99 7b91        ...f......0...
0x0020   7012 4470 18ff 0000 0204 05b4 0101 0402        p.Dp............
Next, the requesting user sends information about himself to the other peer offering the file. The first thing we can identify is the “GET” command. This is telling the Peer providing the file what we want to download from their share folder. In this example, it is an mpeg of a portion of a soccer match between Italy and France. Below that in bold is the Host IP of the user that has the file we are asking to download, 10.10.100.100. The requesting users name is lancemanion. Below that in bold is the Kazaa-IP of 192.168.1.102. This is the IP address of the Peer. The user also provides the IP address of the Supernode we used to find the file, 10.11.111.111.

After the requesting Peer sends his information, the Peer offering the file responds. In this example, the offering Peer sends his IP address (10.10.100.100) and his user name of “mestuffisyoustuf”. We also see the of offering Peer's Supernode address of 10.11.111.111. Below that is information about the file being requested.
After the negotiation and the file is identified, the sending peer begins to send the file as shown in the sample below using TCP port 1214. The first two packets show the sending Peer, peer1.rochester.rr.com sending 1460 bytes of data and then a second packet with another 1460 bytes of data. The third packet is the receiving Peer, 192.168.1.102 acknowledging that he has received the data up to byte 5841 (ack 5841). Two packets of data where sent and one acknowledgement confirming that the bytes that have been sent have been received thus far.

Fourth packet shows another 1460 bytes of data being sent and it continues in this manner until the transfer is completed. They would then tear down the connection gracefully with “fin” and “finack” as in a normal TCP connection.

2921:4381 (1460) ack 323 win 17198 (DF)

4381:5841 (1460) ack 323 win 17198 (DF)
A special feature the KaZaA client offers that others do not is the resume feature. If for some reason a download was not able to complete, when KaZaA Media Desktop is started it tries to complete or initiate any previous unsuccessful downloads the last time the user was online.

**How the exploit works**

Once you download the executable file, you must try to open it in order to get the code to execute. It will replicate itself 150+ times in the shared folder with different names and subjects that might appeal to everyone or come up in several string searches. Below is an example of the files that were created by the virus that contain the virus. Every file is 21 bytes in size. This should stand out to the user attempting to download a movie or even College History Ultimate Study Guide; they should be larger than 21KB. The average KaZaA user probably doesn’t pay attention to the file size or the file extension (i.e. exe).

With the big variety of filenames the virus uses, it could easily spread. For this paper, a box was infected with the virus, and was online for less than 15 minutes to capture some logs and someone downloaded the virus from the test machine before it could be cancelled or taken offline.

If someone downloaded the virus from the test box in a 15-minute timeframe, the virus could spread rapidly. Realistically, not all infected machines will give the virus to another machine every 15 minutes. Below the graph is based on ¼ of the infected machines giving the virus to another machine, how quickly the virus can grow. Starting with one machine infecting another and so on, by the end of 24 hours theoretically 339 machines would be infected.
There were reports that the virus opened up an IRC channel listening for commands from the hacker. At first, there was no indication that this was true. Running Windump on the Windows 98 box that was running KaZaA media desktop and capturing packets with Snort at the perimeter, the virus was executed. After analyzing the captures, there was no indication of an IRC Channel. There was no unusual traffic captured. Here is the netstat -an on the infected box and could not see where port 6667 was listening.

It is listening on TCP port 1214 because KaZaA media desktop is running. When an application is running that accepts inbound connection, the port will show as “LISTENING”. The windows Netbios ports (137, 138, and 139) show as listening as they do on all windows operating systems unless specifically turned off. The established connections shown here are all on port 80, one would be the KaZaA server and the other two are probably advertisements. Towards the top, you see some ports listening that have no address in the “foreign address” column. Four of those, 2162, 2165, 2178, and 2194 correspond with the connections below that are established or waiting. The communication is ongoing or closing and the computer leaves that port open and listening for return traffic on that port until the connection is closed or times out.
The next time the box was infected, it was left connected to the Internet for approximately ½ hour or more and the test box started sending “Syn” packets on port 6667. Here is the screen print of the netstat and a netstat –an. The infected box is not actually listening on port 6667; it is sending a periodic “Sync” packet to the address shown in the screen print below. The “Sync” packets continued without a response.

Below are the packets captures of that traffic. We are only showing a small portion of the packet to clearly identify the interval at which the “Sync” packets are sent. Notice that the source port changes after five tries. In the first section using port 3518, we see that the second attempt is after 3 seconds, then the third 6 seconds from that one and the fourth 12 seconds later, then 26 seconds later the pattern starts again. This is normal for a
TCP connection. It will try four times to send a “Syn” packet and if it doesn’t receive a “Synack” it will timeout and stop trying or in this case, it will attempt again 26 seconds later. When it tries again after five tries, the source port changes because it is a new attempt and the source port is chosen at random by the OS of the client. In this case, our test box is the client.

So by identifying the intervals are normal, we can conclude that this traffic is not a response to a stimulus. In other words, the attacker is not actively prompting the box to make these attempts, the virus is instructing it to do so.

The infected box may be trying to initiate a connection with this machine in order to supply information about itself to the hacker. One piece of information that is evident is the listening port. In the screen print below, the “Syn” attempt is using that source port is 1697. The infected box listens on that port for the “Synack” or “Reset” response.
If the destination box had responded with a “Synack” and the handshake was allowed to continue, the attacker would have an open connection to the infected box. Below is the Windump output for those connection, there is no “Synack” or “Reset” received from 209.68.208.21.

Continuous “Syn” packets with no response can be caused by several things, the box is down, the box cannot respond, or the test server cannot reach the box. If the box was up and had this port open, we would receive a “Synack”. If the box was up and didn’t have the port open, it would send a “Reset”. Could be the attacker wants the machine, 209.68.208.21, to accept the “Syn” packets, log them, and not respond causing the infected machine to keep trying and in the process keeps a port or the channel opened for the attacker when he is ready.

Below is another nmap scan to see if port 1697 is open for communication from everyone. The results show that port 1697 does not appear to be open but is listening according to netstat. This means that it is open to 209.68.208.21 for the “Synack” that TCP requires to complete the handshake.

```
Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA22 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
Interesting ports on (192.168.1.102):
(The 1540 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
Port State Service
113/tcp open auth
139/tcp open netbios-ssn

Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0 seconds
```

When the virus was executed it generated an error message, “Cannot import c:\moo.reg: The specified file is not a registry script. You can import only registry files.” This file, according to Bitdefender at
http://www.bitdefender.com/virusi/virusi_descrieri.php?virus_id=87, contains a list of subfolders in the Program Files folder. It appears that this file is not successfully created.

With an open IRC channel, the attacker would be able to take control of the machine and initiate commands. Here are the actions that could be performed through the IRC channel as reported by Symantec at http://www.sarc.com/avcenter/venc/data/pf/w32.kwbot.worm.html

6

- Manage the installation of the backdoor
- Control the IRC client on the compromised computer
- Dynamically update the installed Trojan
- Send the Trojan to other IRC channels to attempt to compromise more computers
- Download and execute files
- Deliver system and network information to the hacker
- Perform Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against a target that is defined by the hacker
- Uninstall itself completely by removing the relevant registry entries.

In addition to replicating itself in the shared folder for others to download, it creates a file called explorer32.exe in the \windows\system directory.

It creates two entries in the registry in order to execute the file at windows start up.

HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Explorer Update Build 1142=explorer32.exe
HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices\ Explorer Update Build 1142=explorer32.exe

Diagram

Below is a basic network diagram of the test environment. The natting router is set up to allow all TCP and UDP ports inbound to the 192.168.1.102 Windows 98 box. All outbound traffic is permitted. The Linux box was used for the nmap scans. Windump and Ethereal was used to capture traffic to and from the on the Windows 98 box during each test. The laptop was running Snort at the perimeter to capture all traffic to and from the network during testing and to test the Snort IDS rules.

http://www.sarc.com/avcenter/venc/data/pf/w32.kwbot.worm.html
The following diagram shows the Attacker putting the virus on a host that he compromised in order to conceal his identity when the virus starts to propagate. The host marked “master” could be the host that the test box was attempting to contact on port 6667 in the previous captures. The virus would be waiting in the share folder to be downloaded by other KaZaA users and so on.
This diagram shows what was probably intended, to send information back to the master about each system and open an IRC Channel for the attacker to use when he has control of enough hosts.

Once in control a large number of hosts, the attacker could launch a Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacker on a targeted machine. The “zombies” would be instructed by the attacker via the master, what the target host is and what type of Denial of Service attack to initiate.

The diagram below is a typical DDOS. If the virus with the backdoor was not used and propagated using KaZaA media desktop, the virus could still have been propagated through e-mail, other file-sharing systems that do not restrict by file type, or installed by the attacker through some other exploitable vulnerability on the host. Once the host has been compromised and the attacker can control the machine, he can open up an IRC Channel for accepting commands and/or load a “Trojan” that can be triggered through this channel, or other means, and effectively initiate a DDOS.
How to use the exploit

The attacker could easily gain control of many machines using the IRC Channel. Machines that belong to users that do not concern themselves with security, do not have intrusion detection devices running at the perimeter, do not have firewalls protecting them, and may not notice the virus.

“Any attacker who can control 100,000 machines is a major force on the internet, while someone with a million or more is currently unstoppable: able to launch massively diffuse DDOS attacks, perform needle in a hayfield searches, and commit all sorts of other mayhem.”

DDOS, Distributed Denial of Service, attacks using compromised workstation called “zombies”. A popular “zombie” is a home computer on a cable modem or DSL connection to the Internet. Cable and DSL connection are rapidly increasing. A “virus” containing a “backdoor” is one way to compromise a number of hosts to use for a DDOS.

http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/0wn2.html
A “backdoor” is a hidden way for a user to access a compromised system for malicious purposes or a programmer leaving a means to access a system for recovery or troubleshooting.

The reports stated that Kwbot would create a file and send it to the attacker or somewhere the attacker can retrieve it, with information about the compromised system. It would also open an IRC Channel, which would wait for the attacker to issue a command. The command could be to launch a denial of service attack on another host, maybe one of more interest or importance. For example, to take a firewall or intrusion detection device out of commission in order to secretly access bank records, trade secrets, school grades, or just to feel the accomplishment of taking down the targeted system or key network device.

First, the attacker would take the w32.kwbot virus and make it available for download. Obviously, he will want to keep his own identity secret so it cannot be traced back to him. Therefore, he would compromise a home users machine with KaZaA Media Desktop. This would be easy to find with a simple scan for port 1214. He makes the virus available, from this compromised machine, for download disguised with different filenames to appeal to a wide range of users and come up in many searches. Once downloaded by a certain number of users, patiently wait for the virus to propagate.

Users download the virus with the backdoor and they execute the file, thinking they are going to view an “A+ Certification Study Guide”, porn, etc. Part of the malicious code sends a file to another compromised system that the attacker checks regularly. This would tell him that he had another system that he could possibly use for his bidding.

Once he gets enough systems to use for his “zombie”, he can wake them up and run a malicious attack from the compromised hosts in unison at the targeted system.

**Signature of the attack**

There are several signatures easily detected on the host.

- It copies itself to the Windows\System32 directory as explorer32.exe. Normally there is no explorer.exe in that directory.

- It creates 2 registry key values to run explorer32.exe at startup:
  
  - HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Explorer Update
  
  - HLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices\ Explorer Update Build 1142=explorer32.exe

- 150+ copies of the virus will be located in the “C:\Program Files\KaZaA\My Shared Folder” disguised as media files, software, and documents with popular subjects. For example porn, password crackers, study guides, hacker exploits, and current movies. Below is a snapshot of the less offensive filenames. A
complete list of files names are available at

The network signature would be a little more difficult depending on the normal business policy for outbound connections. Some companies allow their users outbound access on any port to anywhere they only restrict inbound traffic. The Cisco PIX for example is designed for that type on environment. With that type of configuration, the users would be allowed to use chat, participate in P2P for file sharing, among many other things. IDS could be used to look for particular signatures of KaZaA or Morpheus in order to track an infection back to the source. For example, the test network was using Snort at the perimeter to capture packets. It could be set up to alert on certain signatures of attacks. You can get rules already written for known attack signatures at http://www.snort.org. Snort.org did not have a rule written specifically for this exploit but they did have one to alert if anyone tries to download a file using KaZaA or Morpheus client on the Fastrack P2P. The snort rule looks like this.

```
```

8 http://www.snort.org/cgi-bin/sigs-search.cgi?sid=kazaa
It will alert when any external host on any source port tries to send a packet to any host on the internal network with a destination port of 1214. It also searches for “X-Kazaa-Username” in the payload. From the dumps in the “Protocol Description” section, anytime users requests to download a file, the payload would contain “X-Kazaa-Username” just before the Username itself. This is true for Kazaa and Morpheus, they both user the same keywords before the actual username.

Because this happens anytime a user downloads a file using Kazaa or Morpheus, this would alert if an internal user was getting a file from someone or if an external user was getting a file from someone internal. Both sending and receiving users send their Username.

Another possibility is to alert each time a user brings up the KaZaA Media desktop by changing the above rule slightly. In the section above, we show that the registration of the user happens on port 80 and we send a string with the user name similar to the rule above. The new rule would look like this.

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg:"Start Kazaa Media desktop"); content:"GET"; depth: 4; content:"kmdstart.htm"; nocase; reference:url,www.kazaa.com; classtype:protocol-command-decode;
```

Here is a more specific rule from snort.com, that just alerts when an external users is requesting a download from one of the internal users. The difference is the destination port number, port 1214 is used for file transfers.

```
```

If the internal users are authorized to share files using KaZaA and Morpheus, then the rule above could generate too many alerts. We could take it one step further and only alert if it involves an executable file, which is the type of file containing this virus. Most times executable files are a risk to download, if you don’t know what they are going to do when opened. Some companies restrict e-mail attachments that have the “.exe” extension. Here is a Snort rule that would alert just if our internal user downloads an executable file using KaZaA or Morpheus.

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 1214 (msg:"EXE download using kazaa") GET request”; content:"GET"; depth: 4; content “X-Kazaa-Username”; content “.exe”; nocase; reference:url,www.kazaa.com;
```

9 See <http://www.snort.org/cgi-bin/sigs-search.cgi?sid=kazaa>
This could easily be changed to alert even if an external users downloads an executable from an internal user. This might be something that the Incident Response Team wants to see, where infection might have come from and where it is has been spread.

```
Alert tcp any any -> any 1214 (msg:"EXE download using kazaa"; GET request"; content:"GET"; depth: 4; content:"X-Kazaa-Username"; content:".exe"; nocase; reference:url,www.kazaa.com;
```

This particular exploit does not have a snort rule available at snort.com, but there are rules available for IRC channels. They will look for ports 6666-7000. This exploit uses port 6667, so it might be wise to look specifically for that port so it can be labeled accordingly in the snort logs.

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 6667 (msg:"IRC Channel for KWBOT virus")
```

**How to protect against it**

We ran two different AntiVirus products on the infected machine, one found it and one did not. Neither could clean the virus.

Below is a screen print of the NOD32 AntiVirus scan output showing that it did not detect the virus. It marked some of the files that contained the virus in the share folder as “OK”.
This screen print is from Symantec Norton AntiVirus software, identified the virus but was not able to clean it. It did give an option later to delete the files, which would have put a stop to it since it did detect the "explorer32.exe" file as well. However, the registry entries would still be there and cause an error at start up.
The AntiVirus products would help identify that the virus existed, then the user could find out what they needed to do to clean out the registry. To protect against getting the virus infection would be simple, don’t use KaZaA. That probably isn’t the right answer, but that would sure help.

As KaZaA warns their users, downloading files from other users is a risk you are taking. They recommend keeping your AntiVirus software updated, but that doesn’t really protect you from getting it. AntiVirus software companies only have the virus signatures to detect once the virus has been released into the outside world. Then it would be too late for some users.

The best suggestions for protecting against this virus for the home user:

- Do not download files with an .exe extension - If it is necessary to download an .exe file, do it with caution. Run it on an isolated workstation if possible or as mentioned below, make note of the file size.
- Be aware of the file size. If it supposed to be a movie, it is going to be larger than 21KB.
- Shutdown the computer when not in use. If the box is infected and an IRC Channel is open allowing the attacker to take control of the machine, it would be best to take the extra security step to shutdown the workstation to avoid being a non-willing participant in an attack.
- Use a personal firewall on the workstation or a firewall at the perimeter of the network with the following controls.
Incident Handling and Hacker Exploits Practical
1/17/2005
By Rita J Will

- Do not allow any inbound access. That would be anything initiated to your
 network or internal machine, if that is possible.
- Use a personal firewall on the home workstation such as Zone Alarm,
 which restricts connections by application.
- At least block IRC chat ports 6666-7000. In most business environment
 IRC chat and IM would not be allowed in and out of the network. As for
 home use and teenagers, it would be almost impossible to shut that down.
- If possible, control the administrator access to the Windows desktop. Do
 not allow everyone to install software on the workstation.

  - Use AntiVirus software and keep it up to date. Even though they can’t guard
  against the virus until it has reached the outside world, most AntiVirus software
  companies will update their list of signatures as quickly as they can. It will at
  least detect it so it can be cleaned up before it is propagated or does any damage.

Most KaZaA users are home users sharing files for personal use, music, movies,
software, etc. Not many companies would choose to use KaZaA to share files with other
companies or customers on the Internet it would be too risky. Although there are those
internal users that want to download something from a friend or get some music to listen
to while working that might infect the network. Businesses should not allow these types
of P2P network connections into their internal network. Here are some suggestions:

  - Security Policy
    - Security Policy should be in place the clearly spells out that company
      computers should be used for business purposes only.
    - Only company-approved software should be installed on laptops or
      workstations. Sometimes locking down their workstations so they are
      unable to install software is not realistic. Therefore, it should be spelled
      out in the security policy.
    - No inbound traffic to workstations from Internet. This can be prevented
      with natting and firewalls.
    - Keep anti-virus software updated on workstations.
    - Consequences if you do not follow this policy.
    - Make sure the policy is available and all employees know it’s there and
      sign something that they have read and will comply.

Firewalls and Security Network Design. A Secure network design could prevent the
internal users from bringing in unwanted infections and intruders into the company
network. Here is an example of a secure network design and some points about this
design. This design may not be realistic for all companies, but there are some security
features included that would discourage the infection of the internal network by the
employees using IRC Chat, ftp, or P2P networks from the inside.

  - More information can be found at the reference at footnote 8 and details about
the configuration at http://www.giac.org/practical/Rita_Will_GCFW.zip.
The Externally accessible servers are separated from the internal network. All Internet users are restricted to the DMZ. No traffic would be allowed from the Internet to the internal workstations, which is where the KaZaA Media Desktop would most likely be installed.

Use proxy servers for outbound access. An Internet proxy server can be restricted to outbound http and https only. The user would be able to get to the KaZaA site to download the software but wouldn’t be able share files and retrieve files since KaZaA uses port 1214. They would however be able to connect to the KaZaA server, since we identified in the earlier section that is accomplished on http port 80.

The Proxy servers, e-mail relays, and the ftp servers could be configured to do content filtering. They could be restricting by file extension, possibly not allowing .exe files to be e-mailed into the company.

Firewalls should restrict inbound traffic to what is required for the business. That means just http and https to the web servers, ftp to the ftp servers, etc. All other ports should be blocked.

Block all outbound ports at the firewall that are not needed for business purposes. This would prevent the internal users from downloading files from other KaZaA users and allowing users to access their files.

The firewall or router should be hiding the internal network from the outside world. Users workstation and database servers should have private addressing and should not be provided to the Internet. If no proxy server, hide addresses should be used to prevent the private address of an internal workstation from being revealed.

The best way is to restrict the internal users Internet access, if that isn’t possible, then there are other issues to address. If they bring this virus into the internal network and it opens an IRC channel. It would be important to have IDS sensors located throughout the network, at least at the perimeter. The IDS sensors should be configured to watch for IRC ports 6666-6667. This would be the only signature of the virus that could be detected at the network. Snort rules are available for IRC detection or can be written to be specific to each exploit.

If there is no firewall the router could be used to restrict access to particular ports. Block all inbound except to the specific ports to specific servers, for example port 80 to the web server and port 20/21 to the ftp servers. In this case, you might allow all outbound traffic, but just restrict particular ports such as the IRC ports 6666-6667 or all TCP and UDP high ports for that matter (anything above 1023). The router can be configured to allow those outbound connections using the high ports only if it is a response to an existing connection.

Workstations and servers should have anti-virus protection and updated automatically.
Source code/Pseudo code

I took a copy of the executable file from the Windows/System directory, explorer32.exe and attempted to reverse engineer the code using Reverse Engineering Compiler (REC).

I ran REC with no special options since there is not much information about this code available. REC will attempt to disassemble it if it recognizes the executable. It didn’t seem to have a problem; therefore, we let it use the default options. The following is the informational message provided by REC when running on explorer32.exe file. It appears that it recognized the executable and was able to generate code.

The results are provided at Appendix A. They really didn’t give us anything useful.

```
explorer32.exe is an NT executable of 0x5400 (21504) bytes
Image base : 0x00400000,  Entry point : 0x0002a000
0x00025000 - 0x00029848 ( 18504)
0x0002a000 - 0x0002a200 ( 512)
0x0002a174 - 0x0002a1df ( 107) Import table at offset 0x00000374
Validating strings...
Finding references...
```

I found a Win32 Disassemble program at http://www.geocities.com/~sangcho/ and ran this against the same executable. This time I got approximately 150 pages of assembler language. A sample of those results is provided at Appendix B.

I still wanted to try and get it to some kind of C code, so I took the output from the Win32 Disassemble program and ran it through Fenris. Didn’t get the results I had hoped. Fenris generated many error messages and nothing that could be interrupted as C language.

NOTE: The reverse engineering results generated too many pages to attach, they can be provide upon request.

Additional Information

More information can be found at the following AntiVirus Software websites:
http://www.sarc.com/avcenter/venc/data/pl/w32.kwbot.worm.html
http://www.sophos.com.virusinfo/analyses/w32kwbota.html
http://vil.mcafee.com/dispVirus.asp?birus_k=99555

The following are links to news articles about the virus:
http://www.techtv.com/news/print/0,23102,3385557,00.html
http://www.vnunet.com/News/1133129
http://resnet.albany.edu/news
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/56/25945.html
Appendices

A

/* This file was automatically created by
 * Reverse Engineering Compiler 1.6 (C) Giampiero Caprino
 * (Mar 31 2002)
 * Input file: 'explorer32.exe'
 */

__entry_point__()
{
    L0042A007();
    asm("Unknown opcode 0xfe");
    > ? L0042a066 :
}

/* Procedure: 0x0042A007 - 0x0042A016
 * Argument size: 0
 * Local size: 0
 * Save regs size: 0
 */
L0042A007()
{
    (restore)esi;
    (restore)edx;
    goto L0042a00b;
    asm("das");
L0042a00b:
    goto L0042a017();
    asm("salc");
    goto L0042a077;
}

/* Procedure: 0x0042A017 - 0x0042A028
 * Argument size: 0
 * Local size: 0
 * Save regs size: 0
 */
L0042A017()
{
    (restore)edi;
    ebx = 539342133;
    eax = L0042A029() + *ecx;
L0042A029()
{
    (restore)edi;
    ebx = ebx + edx;
    asm("adc edi,esi");
    eax = 244;
    edi = edi & ebx;
L0042A03C();
    *(esi - 118) :: bl;
}

L0042A03C()
{
    (restore)esi;
    cl = *ebx;
    edi = edi + 99 | 248;
    ecx = ecx ^ 1206001662;
    goto L0042a051;
    *(ebx + 32210921) = *(ebx + 32210921) + 1;
L0042a051:
    asm("xchg ebp,[edx]"当他);
    asm("enter 0x2eb,0xcd");
    *(ecx + 843571953) = *(ecx + 843571953) & al;
    al :: 193;
    *ebx & 50;
    asm("enter 0xf90b,0x88");
    eax = eax | *(esi + 67);
    edi = edi - edx;
    eax = eax - 1;
    goto L0042a077;
    return;
    *(fsave)(frestore) + *(ebx + -1133182744);
L0042a077:
    asm("ror esi,0xe");
    goto L0042a080;
    bh = 222;
L0042a080:
    asm("int 0x7c");
    eax :: 1971838591;
    edi = edi + 1;
    asm("Unknown opcode 0x8d");
    asm("lloope 0x42a019");
    asm("aas");
    (save)ebx;
    asm("xchg eax,edi");
    esi = esi + 1;
asm("scasd");
asm("xchg eax,ebx");
asm("lahf");
asm("popf");
asm("lahf");
asm("arpl [ebp+0x79f36858],si");

L0042a098:
*edi = eax - *(ecx + -148393277);
edi = edi + 1;
return;
asm("sbb esi,+0x79");
*edi = eax;
edi = edi + 4;
(restore)edx;
asm("out 0x9e,eax");
asm("aam 0xde");
edi = *(ecx + -576027290);
asm("loop 0x42a12f");
ebx = ebx - 1;
asm("xchg eax,esi");
est = esp + 1;
asm("fisubr dword [ebp-0x54]");
(fsave) *(ebp + -1956935394);
asm("aas");
asm("scasb");
al = al & 152;
(restore)esi;
asm("out dx,eax");
asm("%c inc ecx");
asm("aaa");
asm("into");
asm("Unknown opcode 0x8f");
asm("xchg eax,ebp");
asm("xchg eax,edi");
asm("outsb");
est = esi - 1;
al & 143;
eax = eax ^ 1701274983;

L0042a0d6:
est = esi - 1;
asm("xchg eax,ebp");
asm("adc edi,[edi+edx*2]");
goto L526f2796;
*(edi + esi * 4) = *(edi + esi * 4) | 68;
if(esi = bp + di) {
    goto L0042a098;
}
ecx = edi + -527064939;
asm("popf");
asm("lahf");
asm("out dx,al");
asm("cdq");
asm("in eax,0xa3");
(save) -1511364842;
if(!(ah = ah & *esi)) {
    L0042a0ff:
    al = al ^ 8;
asm("repne mov eax,0xe3984ee");
L0000aa3f();
estp = esp | *(esi - 44);
(restore)esp;
*L766B894B = al;
al = *esi;
esi = esi + 1;
asm("fidivr word [ebx] ");
*(ebx + 99) = ebp;
goto L0042a0d6;
edx = edx + 1 + 1;
asm("outsb");
ah = ah - *(esi + 1384995662);
(restore)ecx;
asm("jpe 0x42a0f8");
goto L00009d62;
edx = edx - 1;
}
(save)ds;
ch = ch & *(ebx - 90);
asm("cmpsb");
asm("adc al,0xbc");
(save)ds;
esi = -1109602338;
if(ah = ah & *edx) {
    goto L0042a0ff;
}
dl = dl | *LBDDCCFD0;
edx = 1593342494;
(save)ebp;
asm("int1");
al & 32;
(restore)ds;
gs = *(ecx + -663855310);
asm("insd");
asm("cmpsb");
(restore)esi;
eax = L00006e72();
asm("sti");
asm("Unknown opcode 0xd9");
asm("out dx,eax");
asm("pusha");
(restore)esi;
edx = -198427460;
asm("xchg eax,esp");
asm("xchg eax,edi");
al = al ^ ch;
asm("adc dh,[%ds:ebx+0x5e] ");

/* address size */
/* 0x0042a000 0 */ /* unknown */ void __entry_point__;
/* 0x0042a1a8 0 */ /* unknown */ void __imp_LoadLibraryA;
/* 0x0042a1ac 0 */ /* unknown */ void __imp_GetProcAddress;
Disassembly of File: a:\explorer32.exe

T.DateStamp = 00000000: Thu Jan 01 -8:00:00 1970
Code Offset = 00000000, Code Size = 00007C00
Data Offset = 00000000, Data Size = 00000000

Number of Objects = 0003 (dec), Imagebase = 00400000h
  Object01:   t  RVA: 00001000 Offset: 00000000 Size: 00000000
Flags: C00000E0
  Object02:          RVA: 00025000 Offset: 00000400 Size: 00004848
Flags: C00000E0
  Object03:      a  RVA: 0002A000 Offset: 00000200 Size: 00000200
Flags: C00000E0

.................. RESOURCE INFORMATION ..................

There are no Resources in This Application.

.................. IMPORTED FUNCTIONS ..................

Number of Imported Modules =    1 (decimal)
  Import Module 001: KERNEL32.dll

.................. IMPORT MODULE DETAILS ..................
  Import Module 001: KERNEL32.dll

Addr:0002A1C0 hint(0000) Name: LoadLibraryA
Addr:0002A1CE hint(0000) Name: GetProcAddress

.................. EXPORTED FUNCTIONS ..................

Number of Exported Functions =    0 (decimal)

.................. Possible Strings Inside Code Block ..................

.................. ASSEMBLY CODE LISTING ..................

//************************ Start of Code in Object CODE **************

Program Entry Point = 0042A000 (a:\explorer32.exe File Offset:00000000)

....

//************************ Program Entry Point ********

:0042A000 E802000000              call 0042A007
   (StringData)"^^"
:0042A005 FE7F5E
a little disassemble error near :0042A005

:0042A008 EB
:0042A009 012F                  add dword[edi], ebp
:0042A00B 684BEB1CE0          push E01CEB4B
:0042A010 E802000000              call 0042A017
:0042A015
a little disassemble error near :0042A015
Incident Handling and Hacker Exploits Practical

By Rita J Will

:0042A015 D6
:0042A016 EB5F
:0042A018 5A
:0042A019 EB02
:0042A01B CD20
:0042A01D BB35B52520
:0042A022 EB02000000
:0042A027 0301
:0042A029 5F
:0042A02A 03DA
:0042A02C 13FE
:0042A02E 8D05F4000000
:0042A034 23FB
:0042A036 EB01000000
:0042A03B 385E8A
:0042A03D 08B3C76381CF
:0042A044 F8
:0042A045 0000
:0042A047 08B1F1FE1FE2
:0042A04D 47
:0042A050 FF83E80075BC
:0042A056 872A
:0042A058 C8EB02CD
:0042A05C 2081F1E24732
:0042A062 3CC1
:0042A064 F60332
:0042A067 C80BF988
:0042A06B 0B4643
:0042A06E 2BFA
:0042A070 48
:0042A071 EB02
:0042A073 C3
:0042A074 DC83EB00075BC
:0042A07A C1CE0E
:0042A07D EB01
:0042A07F B7DE
:0042A081 CD7C
:0042A083 3D7FDE8775
:0042A088 47
:0042A089 8DE1
:0042A08B 8D3F
:0042A08D 53
:0042A08E 97
:0042A090 AF
:0042A091 93
:0042A092 9F
:0042A093 9D
:0042A094 9F
:0042A095 63B55868F379
:0042A09B 2BB1C3B227F7
:0042A0A1 AA
:0042A0A2 C2192E
:0042A0A5 83DE79
:0042A0A8 AB
Incident Handling and Hacker Exploits Practical  
By Rita J Will  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0042A0A9</td>
<td>5A  pop edx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0AA</td>
<td>E79E out port[-62], eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0AC</td>
<td>D4DE aam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0AE</td>
<td>8BB96685AADD mov edi, dword[ecx+DDAA8566]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0B4</td>
<td>E279 loop 0042A12F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0B6</td>
<td>4B  dec ebx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0B7</td>
<td>96  xchg eax, esi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0B8</td>
<td>44  inc esp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0B9</td>
<td>DA6DAC fisubr dword[ebp-54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0BC</td>
<td>DF851E895B8B fild l6int[ebp+8B5B091E]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0C2</td>
<td>3F  aas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0C3</td>
<td>AE  scasb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0C4</td>
<td>2490 and al, -68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0C6</td>
<td>5E  pop esi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0C7</td>
<td>EF  out port[dx], eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0C8</td>
<td>2E41 inc ecx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0CA</td>
<td>37  aaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0CB</td>
<td>CE  into</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0CC</td>
<td>8F95976E4EA8 a little disassemble error near 0042A0CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0D2</td>
<td>8F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0D3</td>
<td>3567656765 xor eax, 65676567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0D8</td>
<td>4E  dec esi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0D9</td>
<td>95  xchg eax, ebp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0DA</td>
<td>13C57 adc edi, dword[edi+2*edx]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0DD</td>
<td>E9B4862C52 jmp 526F2796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0E2</td>
<td>830CB744 or dword[edi+4*esi], 00000044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0E6</td>
<td>67BD33 lea esi, word[bp+di]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0E9</td>
<td>75AD jne 0042A098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0EB</td>
<td>8D8F95A095E0 lea ecx, dword[edi+E095A095]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0F1</td>
<td>9D  popfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0F2</td>
<td>9F  lahf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0F3</td>
<td>EE  out port[dx], al</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0F4</td>
<td>99  cdq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0F5</td>
<td>E5A3 in eax, port[-5D]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0F7</td>
<td>681667EEA5 push A5EA6716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0FC</td>
<td>2226 and ah, byte[esi]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A0FE</td>
<td>7534 jne 0042A134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A100</td>
<td>3408 xor al, 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A102</td>
<td>F2 a little disassemble error near 0042A102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A103</td>
<td>BB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A104</td>
<td>EE  out port[dx], al</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A105</td>
<td>8439 test byte[ecx], bh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A107</td>
<td>0E  push cs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A108</td>
<td>9A729F9EEB3FAA call far 9F72:AA3FEB9E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A10F</td>
<td>0B66D4 or esp, dword[esi-2C]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A112</td>
<td>5C  pop esp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A113</td>
<td>A24B896B76 mov byte[766B894B], al</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A118</td>
<td>AC  lodsb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A119</td>
<td>DE3B fidivr l6int[ebx]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A11B</td>
<td>896B63 mov dword[ebx+63], ebp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A11E</td>
<td>EBB6 jmp 0042A0D6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A120</td>
<td>42  inc edx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A121</td>
<td>42  inc edx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042A122</td>
<td>6E  outs port[dx], byte</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a little disassemble error near :0042A0CC  
:0042A0D2 8F  
:0042A0D3 3567656765 xor eax, 65676567  
:0042A0D8 4E dec esi  
:0042A0D9 95 xchg eax, ebp  
:0042A0DA 13C57 adc edi, dword[edi+2*edx]  
:0042A0DD E9B4862C52 jmp 526F2796  
:0042A0E2 830CB744 or dword[edi+4*esi], 00000044  
:0042A0E6 67BD33 lea esi, word[bp+di]  
:0042A0E9 75AD jne 0042A098  
:0042A0EB 8D8F95A095E0 lea ecx, dword[edi+E095A095]  
:0042A0F1 9D popfd  
:0042A0F2 9F lahf  
:0042A0F3 EE out port[dx], al  
:0042A0F4 99 cdq  
:0042A0F5 E5A3 in eax, port[-5D]  
:0042A0F7 681667EEA5 push A5EA6716  
:0042A0FC 2226 and ah, byte[esi]  
:0042A0FE 7534 jne 0042A134  
:0042A100 3408 xor al, 08  
:0042A102 F2 a little disassemble error near :0042A102  
:0042A103 BB  
:0042A104 EE out port[dx], al  
:0042A105 8439 test byte[ecx], bh  
:0042A107 0E push cs  
:0042A10F 0B66D4 or esp, dword[esi-2C]  
:0042A112 5C pop esp  
:0042A113 A24B896B76 mov byte[766B894B], al  
:0042A118 AC lodsb  
:0042A119 DE3B fidivr l6int[ebx]  
:0042A11B 896B63 mov dword[ebx+63], ebp  
:0042A11E EBB6 jmp 0042A0D6  
:0042A120 42 inc edx  
:0042A121 42 inc edx  
:0042A122 6E outs port[dx], byte
References


Staniford, Stuart., Paxon, Vern., and Weaver, Nicholas. How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time. URL: http://www.usenix.org/events/sec02/staniford.html.


Minar, Nelson. Distributed Systems Topologies: Part 1 and 2

:0042A123 2AA64E5B8D52 sub ah, byte[esi+528D5B4E]
:0042A129 59 pop ecx
Incident Handling and Hacker Exploits Practical
By Rita J Will


Heiser, Jay. “Combating Nonviral Malware, Tojans, sniffers and spyware, oh my!”

Liu, Yana. W32.Kwbot.Worm. URL:

Dragu, Bogdan. Backdoor.K0wbot.1.3.B. URL:

Sophos Anti-Virus. W32/KWBot-A. URL:

McAfee Virus Profile. W32/Kwbot.Worm. URL:

Worley, Becky. KaZaA Worm Targets Users. URL:

Middleton, James. Kowbot worm targets Kazaa Network. URL:


Leyden, John. GamesSpy and KaZaA infected by viruses. URL:

Landesman, Mary. KaZaA Worm, Benjamin a ploy for profit.
http://anitvirus.about.com/library/weekly/aa052002a.htm

Singer, Michael. 'Benjamin' Worm plagues KaAaA.
# Upcoming SANS Penetration Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SANS Northern VA - Reston Spring 2020</th>
<th>Reston, VA</th>
<th>Mar 02, 2020 - Mar 07, 2020</th>
<th>Live Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SANS Munich March 2020</td>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
<td>Mar 02, 2020 - Mar 07, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Secure Japan 2020</td>
<td>Tokyo, Japan</td>
<td>Mar 02, 2020 - Mar 14, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentor Session @work- SEC542</td>
<td>Oklahoma City, OK</td>
<td>Mar 03, 2020 - Apr 02, 2020</td>
<td>Mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS St. Louis 2020</td>
<td>St. Louis, MO</td>
<td>Mar 08, 2020 - Mar 13, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Prague March 2020</td>
<td>Prague, Czech Republic</td>
<td>Mar 09, 2020 - Mar 14, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas 2020 - SEC504: Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling</td>
<td>Dallas, TX</td>
<td>Mar 09, 2020 - Mar 14, 2020</td>
<td>vLive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Dallas 2020</td>
<td>Dallas, TX</td>
<td>Mar 09, 2020 - Mar 14, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Doha March 2020</td>
<td>Doha, Qatar</td>
<td>Mar 14, 2020 - Mar 19, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Norfolk 2020</td>
<td>Norfolk, VA</td>
<td>Mar 16, 2020 - Mar 21, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS San Francisco Spring 2020</td>
<td>San Francisco, CA</td>
<td>Mar 16, 2020 - Mar 27, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Kuwait March 2020</td>
<td>Salmiya, Kuwait</td>
<td>Mar 21, 2020 - Mar 26, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community SANS Austin SEC504 © CISCO</td>
<td>Austin, TX</td>
<td>Mar 23, 2020 - Mar 28, 2020</td>
<td>Community SANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community SANS Ottawa SEC560</td>
<td>Ottawa, ON</td>
<td>Mar 30, 2020 - Apr 04, 2020</td>
<td>Community SANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Frankfurt March 2020</td>
<td>Frankfurt, Germany</td>
<td>Mar 30, 2020 - Apr 04, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentor Session - SEC504</td>
<td>Austin, TX</td>
<td>Apr 01, 2020 - Jun 03, 2020</td>
<td>Mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentor Session - SEC504</td>
<td>Denver, CO</td>
<td>Apr 03, 2020 - Apr 24, 2020</td>
<td>Mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS 2020</td>
<td>Orlando, FL</td>
<td>Apr 03, 2020 - Apr 10, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Riyadh April 2020</td>
<td>Riyadh, Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Apr 04, 2020 - Apr 16, 2020</td>
<td>Live Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS 2020 - SEC504: Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling</td>
<td>Orlando, FL</td>
<td>Apr 05, 2020 - Apr 10, 2020</td>
<td>vLive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentor Session - SEC504</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>Apr 07, 2020 - May 19, 2020</td>
<td>Mentor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>